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Abstract
Zimbabwe is embarking on a long, complex, and difficult journey to rebuild its economy, which has been 
shattered by years of neglect and destructive government policies.  If the final political hurdles are overcome―
hopefully sooner rather than later—the new coalition government will be faced with making politically 
difficult decisions and addressing conclusively the economic ghosts of the past.  One of those ghosts is more 
than $5 billion owed to external creditors, of which nearly 80 percent is arrears.  Clearing Zimbabwe’s external 
debt arrears and securing comprehensive debt relief will be a critical step in eventual recovery.  By doing so, 
the government will remove a crippling burden on its budget, investment climate, and overall macroeconomic 
environment.  More important to the success of the coalition government, it will unlock hundreds of millions 
of dollars in new external assistance for critical reconstruction programs that will improve the Zimbabwean 
people’s quality of life.  This paper provides a detailed overview of the arrears clearance and debt relief 
processes.  The purpose is to spark a debate in creditor capitals and hopefully to buttress the government’s 
analytical foundation.  With a strong dedicated team of experts—and support from relevant donor agencies—
the Zimbabwean government will one day conclusively address its crushing debt burden and proceed with the 
rebuilding of a once vibrant and proud nation. 
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I.  Overview 
 
Zimbabwe’s current political impasse may make discussions about arrears clearance and 
debt relief for the country appear premature.  Yet there are good reasons to think 
proactively about the steps ahead for both short-term arrears clearance and long-term debt 
relief.  As of this writing, the power-sharing agreement remains formally in place –  
which while highly imperfect – provides a window of opportunity for progress.  While 
uncertain, it is still possible that good-faith actions by the key parties to the agreement 
could place the unity government back on track.  This would force donors to either 
scramble to address the critical external debt and arrears issues or slow down 
Zimbabwe’s reengagement process with the international financial community.  Both 
issues entail long processes with multiple steps and complex sequencing.  An agreed 
roadmap forward will enable the international community and Zimbabwean finance 
officials to act more quickly if positive and conclusive political movement occurs.  In 
particular, the ability to act swiftly on arrears to the major international financial 
institutions will be critical to supporting momentum toward economic recovery and will 
itself help to reinforce political progress.  Indeed, even the most pessimistic projections 
still recognize that Zimbabwe will one day transition back to democracy and require 
action on the inherited debt as an unavoidable component of national reconstruction.   
 
The Zimbabwean finance ministry projects that reconstruction costs will exceed $5 
billion over time.
1  This includes both short-term infusions to restart agricultural and 
manufacturing activity as well as rehabilitation of service delivery infrastructure (water, 
health, education, electricity).  All of these sectors have been devastated by misguided 
government policies, under-funding, and outright corruption.  Under its Short-Term 
Emergency Recovery Program (STERP), the coalition government already has taken 
aggressive steps to stabilize the economy, such as cash-based budgeting, dollarization, 
and removal of quasi-fiscal payments to un-competitive state-owned enterprises.  Given 
the paucity of government revenues, external assistance will be critical to financing large 
reconstruction programs.  Moreover, this assistance will help to improve business 
confidence in Zimbabwe’s economy and facilitate foreign and domestic investment.   
 
The coalition government, if it is to ultimately succeed, must address a number of 
haunting Mugabe-era legacies before achieving a comprehensive and clean break with 
the past.
2  One key legacy is Zimbabwe’s unsustainable external debt burden, which 
dwarfs the government’s revenue base and impedes new donor assistance.  Although the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors largely ceased development 
assistance programs in 2000 after the Zimbabwean government defaulted on its loans, 
they are enormous relative to Zimbabwe’s economy.  Currently, Zimbabwe’s external 
debt stock totals over $5 billion – of which, roughly 80 percent is in arrears.  External 
debt stands at a crippling 166 percent of gross domestic product and 320 percent of 
annual export receipts.  Zimbabwe owes over $2 billion to Paris Club creditors and $1.2 
                                                 
1 See Zimbabwe’s Short-Term Emergency Recovery Program, March 2009, page 20. 
2 See also Todd Moss and Stewart Patrick, “After Mugabe: Applying Post-Conflict Recovery Lessons to 
Zimbabwe,” Africa Policy Journal, Harvard University, Spring 2006.  
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billion to IFIs (World Bank, African Development Bank, and International Monetary 
Fund).  It also has sizable debt obligations to non-traditional bilateral governments and 
commercial creditors.   
 
The implications of this debt burden are significant.  Over the medium term, demands 
from debt service will squeeze the budget for reconstruction programs and create an 
“overhang” that will deter private investors.  Yet more worrying is the immediate impact:  
clearing loan arrears is a binding prerequisite for securing new IFI and bilateral donor 
assistance.  Thus failing to deal with the arrears problem will immediately hinder efforts 
by the coalition government to access international assistance and restart the economy.  
Many potentially large creditors will be legally constrained to help Zimbabwe only 
through humanitarian assistance or through special (inherently much smaller) funds for 
fragile or post-conflict states.  In addition, failing to act will only make the arrears 
problem worse.  As laid out below, more payments are due in the coming months, which 
will only add to the total arrears stock.  Time is of the essence given the lengthy 
processes laid out below – both for short-term arrears clearance and for long-term debt 
relief.     
 
In this paper, we lay out the arrears clearance and debt relief processes that Zimbabwe 
will face over the coming months and years.  We explain the sequencing and inter-
linkages between the relevant creditor stakeholders, including the Paris Club, IMF, World 
Bank, African Development Bank, commercial creditors, and non-traditional bilateral 
government such as China (see Appendix V for a summary of the arrears clearance and 
debt relief steps).  The underlying objective is to support the Zimbabwe government’s 
development of a robust external debt management strategy.  Going forward, we strongly 
urge the authorities to assemble a dedicated team of experts within the Ministry of 
Finance and Prime Minister’s office to tackle these issues immediately and for creditors 




II.  IFI ENGAGEMENT – HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
World Bank:  Between 1980 and 1999, the World Bank provided assistance to Zimbabwe 
totaling nearly $1.6 billion.  Funding largely concentrated on the infrastructure, 
agriculture, and health sectors (see Appendix I for the complete list of past projects).  The 
World Bank’s hard-loan facility – the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) – provided 58 percent of the relevant financing for these programs.  
Zimbabwe had access to these market-based loans given its status as an “IDA-blend” 
country.
3  The World Bank’s concessional financing facility –the International 
Development Association (IDA) – provided the remaining 42 percent.     
 
The World Bank suspended its lending program in 2000 after the Zimbabwean 
government went into arrears on loan repayments.  Since then, the World Bank’s role has 
been limited to technical assistance and analytical work focusing on macroeconomic 
                                                 
3 See further explanation of IDA-blend status and ramifications in Section VI.  
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policy, food security, agrarian reform, social sector delivery, infrastructure needs, and 
HIV/AIDS program support.  In 2005, the World Bank prepared an Interim Strategy Note 
to address knowledge gaps, which has helped establish a baseline for the current donor 
reengagement – particularly in the transportation, health, education, and agricultural 
sectors. 
 
African Development Bank:  Since inception, the African Development Bank (AfDB) has 
provided assistance to Zimbabwe totaling over UA 729 million (roughly $1.1 billion).
4  
Funding largely concentrated on the infrastructure, extractive industries, agriculture, and 
the financial sectors.  The AfDB’s hard-loan facility provided 89 percent of the relevant 
financing for these programs.  The AfDB’s concessional financing window, the African 
Development Fund (AfDF), provided the remaining 11 percent.  Like the World Bank, 
the AfDB suspended its lending program in 2000 after the government went into arrears 
on existing loan repayments.  Since the political agreement was reached last September, 
the AfDB has been actively engaged with the Zimbabwean government.  It has provided 
technical assistance and is playing a leading advisory role on reconstruction planning and 
reengagement with the donor community. 
 
International Monetary Fund:  Between 1980 and 1999, the IMF implemented three 
staff-monitored programs in Zimbabwe (see Appendix II for additional details).  
Financial assistance totaled SDR 374 million (approximately $575 million).
5  Of this, the 
General Resources Account
6, which is the IMF’s non-concessional window, provided 
approximately SDR 222 million ($341 million) and the more concessional Poverty 
Reduction Growth Facility Trust Fund provided SDR 152 million ($234 million).   
 
Since February 2001, Zimbabwe has been in continuous arrears to the IMF and is the 
only country currently in protracted arrears to the PRGF Trust Fund.
7  In December 
2003, the IMF Managing Director and Board of Directors formally initiated procedures 
to expel Zimbabwe from the IMF due to continued arrears to the General Resources 
Account (GRA) and its cessation of any repayments that year.
8  While the Board 
considered the compulsory expulsion on several occasions between 2003 and 2006, 
formal action was never taken.  In the end, the Zimbabwean government avoided 
expulsion by clearing its GRA arrears (although not its PRGF arrears) through several 
payments in 2004, 2005, and 2006, which totaled SDR 117 million ($181 million).  
However, the IMF Board decided to continue Zimbabwe’s ineligibility for future GRA 
assistance.  Moreover, the IMF kept in place the decisions taken to address Zimbabwe's 
continued arrears to the PRGF Trust Fund, including the: (1) declaration of non-
cooperation; (2) suspension of technical assistance; and (3) removal of Zimbabwe from 
the list of PRGF-ESF eligible countries.  
                                                 
4 This utilizes the June 17 UA/USD exchange rate of 1.5374.  Note the AfDB Group’s UA has an 
equivalent exchange rate as the IMF’s SDR.   
5 This utilizes the June 17 SDR/USD exchange rate of 1.5374. 
6 The General Resources Account is the IMF’s central account providing non-concessional loans to middle-
income countries.  The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) provides assistance to low-income 
countries on a more concessional basis. 
7 IMF Press Release No. 06/45 




Loan Arrears Accumulation:  As noted above, the Zimbabwean government largely 
halted payments to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other external 
creditors in 2000.  By 2006, total external loan principal and interest arrears totaled $3.0 
billion (see figure 1 below).  As of April 2009, IFI arrears had reached over $1.2 billion.  
The World Bank accounts for $673 million; the African Development Bank, $438 
million; and the IMF, $134 million.    
 
Figure 1 – Total Arrears Stock and Ratios: 2006, projected for 2011 
 
 
Source: IDA (2007), Further Elaboration of a Systemic Approach to Arrears Clearance 
 
IFI arrears will continue to accumulate in the coming years as additional principal and 
interest payments come due.  For example, Zimbabwe will owe the IBRD and IDA 
roughly $172 million in debt service payments between 2009 and 2012.
9  Figure 2 below 
outlines IDA and IBRD estimated debt service payments falling due over time.  The 
annual growth rate in World Bank arrears will average roughly 12 percent until 2012 
when IBRD obligations taper off.  After that, arrears will grow annually by about 6 
percent.
10  Repayment obligations to the African Development Bank will continue to 
compile in a similar fashion.  This continued accumulation demonstrates the need to clear 
Zimbabwe’s arrears as quickly as possible and to build a financial buffer into any 





Figure 2 – Estimated World Bank Group Debt Service Payments 
 
Source: World Bank, Estimated Debt Service Database 
 
International Sanctions:  During the 2000s, several countries – including the United 
States, European Union, and Australia – imposed targeted financial and travel sanctions 
against select members of Zimbabwe’s former ruling party (ZANU-PF) for un-
democratic activities and human rights abuses.  By illustration, the United States has 
frozen U.S.-based assets of 137 individuals, 36 companies, and 28 farms through the 
                                                 
9 These figures reflect balances as of May 31, 2009.   
10 IDA (2007).  “Further Elaboration of a Systematic Approach to Arrears Clearance.”  p3. 
2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011
3.0 4.7 44.4 69.7 155.8 346.7
Volume (US$ billion)  Arrears-to-GDP (%)  Arrears-to-exports (%)
Year Principal Charges Total Principal Charges Total Principal Charges Total
2009 17.7 4.1 21.8 9.8 2.4 12.2 27.5 6.5 34.0
2010 30.2 6.2 36.4 13.2 3.2 16.4 43.4 9.3 52.8
2011 27.6 3.9 31.5 13.2 3.1 16.3 40.8 7.0 47.8
2012 17.4 2.0 19.4 15.6 3.0 18.6 33.0 5.0 38.0
Total 108.5 17.4 125.9 440.5 36.3 476.8 549.0 53.7 602.7
2009-2012 92.9 16.2 109.1 51.9 11.6 63.4 144.7 27.8 172.5
2013-2037 15.7 1.2 16.8 388.7 24.7 413.4 404.3 25.9 430.2
IDA IBRD Total 
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Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  Moreover, U.S. entities or persons are 
prohibited from conducting business transactions with these entities or on their behalf.  
Lastly, the U.S. Department of State has imposed travel sanctions against a wide range of 
government officials.  Currently, these measures remain in place.  However none of these 
measures should have any direct effect on arrears clearance or debt relief since they are 
against individuals and firms, not the government itself. 
 
The one potential exception is U.S. legislation, the 2001 Zimbabwe Democracy and 
Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA).  ZDERA directs the U.S. representatives at the major 
financial institutions to oppose any new credits or debt relief to Zimbabwe until the U.S. 
President determines that certain conditions have been met.  In practice, however, 
ZDERA has had no discernible impact on U.S. or IFI assistance programs as the 
reductions in credit have been based on arrears accumulation and deterioration in 
performance, rather than votes by the boards.  Once the U.S. government makes a 
decision to actively support arrears clearance and debt relief for Zimbabwe, there may be 
some additional legislative action required to clear the way (see Appendix VII for 
additional detail on ZDERA).  
 
III.  RECENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVENTS 
 
March 2008 Elections and Provisional Government:  In March 2008, Zimbabwe held 
presidential and parliamentary elections, which Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) candidate Morgan Tsvangirai won with an estimated 49.4 percent of the vote.
11  
Following widespread violence and political upheaval, Zimbabwe held a runoff election 
between Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe in late June 2008.
12  Citing voter 
persecution and intimidation, MDC President Tsvangirai withdrew from the runoff.   
Mugabe went on to win a landslide election – which again was internationally 
condemned as a flawed process – and retained the presidency.  Following several months 
of mediation led by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Tsvangirai 
and Mugabe reached a power-sharing agreement in September 2008.  Under the 
agreement, Tsvangirai became Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister overseeing the Council of 
Ministers with Mugabe retaining the presidency and control over the security forces.  To 
date, several aspects of the agreement remain outstanding, such as the continued role of 
Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono and the appointment of Attorney General Johannes 
Tomana.  Under the provisional agreement, the MDC gained the post of Finance 
Minister, to which Prime Minister Tsvangirai appointed his MDC party deputy Tendai 
Biti – a lawyer by training and key political and economic advisor.  
 
Macroeconomic Stabilization Efforts:  Under the auspices of the Short-Term Emergency 
Recovery Program (STERP), the Finance Ministry has taken a series of steps to stabilize 
the country’s macroeconomic situation while still attempting to address pressing social 
service delivery needs.  On the budgetary front, it has halted the Reserve Bank’s quasi-
                                                 
11 The 49.4 percent figure is based on the compilation of results posted at each individual polling station.  
Official Zimbabwe Electoral Commission figures put Tsvangirai’s share at 47.8 percent compared to 
Mugabe’s 43.2 percent.  However, the international community raised significant concerns about the 
validity of these figures. 
12 Under the Zimbabwean constitution, an absolute majority is required to win the presidency.  
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fiscal activities and introduced measures to bring the budget into balance (i.e., spending 
only what the government receives in revenues on a month-by-month basis).  The 
Reserve Bank’s quasi-fiscal expenditures reached $1.1 billion in 2008 (roughly 36 
percent of GDP)
13 and were directed for election-related expenses, grant transfers to 
parastatals, direct lending subsidies, subsidized purchase and distribution of agricultural 
equipment and inputs (fertilizer, seeds, fuel), and subsidized access to foreign exchange.  
These expenditures were financed through surrender requirements on export proceeds, 
confiscation of foreign currency-denominated bank deposits, intervention into the parallel 
exchange rate market, and especially expansion of the money supply.  Up until the 
power-sharing agreement, the Reserve Bank’s tentacles permeated and distorted nearly 
every aspect of the Zimbabwean economy.   
 
The government also surrendered to widespread dollarization of the economy and 
abandoned the Zimbabwean dollar as the unit of exchange.  It has established a multi-
currency system with the South African rand operating as the reference currency.  While 
the U.S. dollar remains widely used in transactions, including recent public sector wage 
payments, the government plans to present its next budget in rand, mandate the rand for 
tax assessments, and adopt it as the sole unit of account for the public and private sectors.   
 
The coalition government also is examining ways to address public sector employee 
grievances, particularly concerning wages.  Given the erosive nature of Zimbabwe’s 
hyperinflationary environment, labor strikes by doctors, teachers, nurses, and government 
employees have been a regular occurrence over recent years.  As a first step, the 
government is conducting an audit of public sector payrolls to remove ghost workers.  
While this will free up budgetary resources to increase salary payments for real workers, 
additional measures will be required to improve morale and productivity. 
 
The government also plans to implement a series of reforms to improve the business 
environment with the aim of attracting foreign capital.  Key components will include the 
provision of adequate property rights and contract sanctity assurances, which were 
systematically undermined by the Mugabe regime.  There is widespread agreement that 
foreign capital and donor assistance will be critical to turning around the Zimbabwean 
economy. 
 
IV.  CURRENT DEBT DYNAMICS 
 
General Overview:  According to the IMF, Zimbabwe is already in “debt distress”.  As of 
end-2008, Zimbabwe’s public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) external debt stood at $5.1 
billion – of which, nearly $4 billion was in arrears.  In relative terms, Zimbabwe’s 
external debt is approximately 166 percent of the country’s gross domestic product and 
320 percent of annual export receipts.  In 2008, debt service totaled roughly 270 percent 
of total government revenues.  The sheer size, along with political turbulence and 
collapse of economic output, further explains the accumulation of external debt arrears 
(as noted above). 
 
                                                 
13 IMF Country Report No. 09/139  
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Absent debt relief, Zimbabwe’s external debt ratios will remain highly unsustainable over 
the medium- to long-term.  Figure 3 below compares Zimbabwe’s existing debt ratios to 
those deemed sustainable for “poor performing” countries under the World Bank/IMF 
Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF).
14   
 
Figure 3 – External Debt Ratios versus Respective World Bank/IMF Debt 




Paris Club:  As of September 2008, Paris Club creditors had nearly $2.1 billion in 
outstanding claims on Zimbabwe.  Of this, $1.2 billion was for development assistance 
loans and the remainder for non-concessional loans.  United States government exposure 
to Zimbabwe totals roughly $205 million, which includes accumulated interest arrears.  
Other Paris Club creditors currently are unwilling to publicly share their exposure 
figures.  However, it is commonly known that the largest Paris Club creditors are 
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States (in descending order).   
 
In light of the non-transparent reporting, we have examined publicly available 
information on development assistance loans extended by OECD-DAC member countries 
since 1980 (see Appendix III).  Germany has provided the largest amount of development 
loans by far ($338 million) – followed by Japan ($167 million), the European 
Commission ($140 million), France ($136 million), Italy ($126 million), United 
Kingdom ($94 million), Finland ($82 million), and the United States ($67 million).  
Canada, which assumes the G-8 Presidency this fall, provided only $24 million in 
development loans.  These figures do not reflect loan repayments and the accumulation of 
interest arrears – nor do they include non-concessional loans such as export credits.   
 
Non-Traditional Creditors:  Given the cessation of traditional donor funding, such as the 
IFIs and Paris Club member countries, non-traditional creditors have played an 
increasingly important role in recent years.  Press reports and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that China, Malaysia, and some Middle Eastern countries (e.g., Iran) provided 
several billions of dollars in loans since 2000.  Some of these loans likely were 
collateralized with mineral deposits (e.g., gold, platinum) and/or export receipts.  The 
new Zimbabwean government will need to conduct a careful and thorough audit of these 
external debt commitments in the coming months.  The result could be a potentially large 
                                                 
14 The World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability Framework determines “sustainable” debt levels based upon 
the performance level of recipient governments.  The underlying premise is that poorly governed countries 
are more likely to become debt-distressed at lower external indebtedness levels.  Performance levels are 
based upon the World Bank’s and African Development Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessments (CPIA), which evaluate countries according to 16 policy categories.  A “poor performing” 
country is defined as having a CPIA score of less than 3.25 (out of 6).  In operational terms, IDA and AfDF 
compare these debt distress thresholds against current and projected debt ratios to determine risk 
classifications.  In turn, these classifications determine whether a country should receive grants, loans, or a 
combination of the two. 
Debt-to-GDP Debt-to-Exports Debt Service-to-Exports
Zimbabwe 166% 320% 22%
DSF Thresholds 30% 100% 15%
Differential 136% 220% 7% 
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upward adjustment of Zimbabwe’s external debt stock above the current $5.1 billion 
level and the associated indebtedness indicators.   
 
In June 2009, the Zimbabwean government announced a $950 million credit line from 
China.  However, the terms and projected use are unclear at this point.  Large Chinese 
credit lines to other African countries, such as Nigeria and Angola, have not been utilized 
extensively.  Nonetheless, any usage would further increase Zimbabwe’s external 
indebtedness levels and complicate the arrears clearance and debt relief process. 
 
Domestic Debt:  Zimbabwe’s domestic debt situation is less acute.  The Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe fully repaid local currency-denominated debt in late January 2009.  
Hyperinflation, which reached 500 billion percent in September 2008, made the value of 
these domestic debt obligations worthless.  Hence, the Reserve Bank was able to clear 
these obligations with relative ease.  The remainder of domestic debt obligations is 
denominated in foreign-currency.  As of December 2008, these obligations totaled nearly 
$460 million.
15   
 
Commercial Debt Exposure:  Publicly available information on Zimbabwe’s commercial 
debt exposure is limited.  Similar to non-traditional creditors, the Zimbabwean 
government will need to conduct a thorough audit of commercial creditor claims and 
repayment status.  Commercial credit has been limited in recent years due to the 
worsening economic crisis; however, historical claims potentially may be significant.  
One institution that continued to facilitate credit is the Cairo-based Africa Export-Import 
Bank, which has one of its two regional headquarters offices in Harare.
16  In 2006/2007, 
Afrexim Bank financed five transactions for the Zimbabwean government totaling $115 
million in trade credit.  Third-party institutions, such as BNP Paribas, provided an 
additional $115 million for these transactions.  Of the total, $180 million went directly to 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
17  Similar to non-traditional creditors, the new 
Zimbabwean government will need to conduct a careful and thorough audit of 
commercial debt commitments over the coming months.  Moreover, the government will 
need to examine whether commercial creditors have pursued litigation in response to 
non-payment.  This has been a serious problem in several HIPCs, such as Liberia and the 
Republic of Congo (see Appendix IV).  In Liberia, commercial creditor litigation awards 
totaled $357 million, or 49 percent of its GDP.   
 
V.    ARREARS CLEARANCE PROCESS AND IFI REENGAGEMENT 
 
The arrears clearance process is complicated, lengthy, and based on a precise sequencing 
of incremental actions.  While each respective institution or body (World Bank, African 
Development Bank, IMF, and Paris Club) has its own specific policies and requirements, 
inter-institutional coordination plays a critical role.  We lay out each organization’s 
arrears clearance process and policies below – while noting the interlinkages among 
them.  Moreover, strong political support from IFI shareholders and (mostly the same) 
                                                 
15 IMF Country Report No. 09/139, p28. 
16 The other is in Abuja, Nigeria. 
17 Africa Export-Import Bank, 2007 Annual Report  
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bilateral donors is critical to advancing the processes expeditiously.  Given this, the 
Zimbabwean government needs to cultivate close relationships with the most influential 
shareholders and creditors, address any related concerns, and establish a clear track 
record of implementing sound policies going forward. 
 
World Bank:  IDA utilizes two general approaches for arrears clearance operations – of 
which, both require formal approval by the World Bank Board of Directors.  First, IDA 
can utilize a recipient country’s regular allocation to clear World Bank Group arrears.
18  
Second, the World Bank can provide an “exceptional arrears clearance grant”.  This 
entails the provision of a bridge loan by a donor, which in turn would be repaid with the 
proceeds of the exceptional IDA grant.  Zimbabwe’s regular allocation would only cover 
a small portion of existing IBRD and IDA arrears (roughly 15 percent).  Therefore, it will 
require an exceptional arrears clearance grant. 
 
Eligibility Criteria:  To qualify for exceptional arrears clearance support, recipient 
countries must meet IDA’s basic income and creditworthiness criteria (outlined in greater 
detail in Section VII).  In addition, the World Bank will work closely with the 
Zimbabwean government to establish a track record of performance on macroeconomic 
and development-related reform measures.  In this context, Zimbabwe will need to meet 
three key additional conditions: (1) commitment to implement a medium-term reform 
program endorsed by the World Bank; (2) performance under an IMF program; and (3) 
an agreed financing plan to clear other IFI arrears simultaneously.
19  Lastly, Zimbabwe 
must become eligible for the HIPC Initiative prior to the arrears clearance operation (see 
Section VI below). 
 
Available Funding:  Under the 15
th IDA Replenishment, shareholders agreed to earmark 
$1.1 billion to finance arrears clearance operations for Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, 
Sudan, and Togo.  Moreover, the Replenishment Agreement stipulates that any unused 





Repayment Capacity and Financing Needs:  IDA staff will conduct an assessment of 
Zimbabwe’s repayment capacity to determine the appropriate volume and concessionality 
of exceptional IDA resources required to clear all outstanding World Bank Group arrears.  
This assessment will be carried out in close cooperation with the IMF and African 
Development Bank.  In general, it will address three issues: (1) domestically available 
resources
21; (2) debt sustainability concerns
22; and (3) financing gap projections.  Given 
                                                 
18 While non-accrual status (i.e., existence of payment arrears) disqualifies countries from utilizing their 
regular allocation for development programs, they may utilize it for arrears clearance operations. 
19 In practice, the World Bank can agree to a sequential arrears clearance approach on a case-by-case basis.  
This approach requires mutual agreement among all relevant IFIs (IMF and AfDB).   
20 World Bank (2008), Additions to IDA Resources: Fifteenth Replenishment, p40. 
21 Under the domestic resource pillar, IDA will consider: (i) international reserves relative to imports; (ii) 
any limitations to utilizing reserves to repay external arrears; (iii) fiscal account projections; (iv) the level  
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Zimbabwe’s fragile fiscal and macroeconomic state, the World Bank likely will not 
require the government to contribute substantial (or possibly any) domestic resources 
towards the arrears clearance operation. 
 
African Development Bank:  The AfDB’s Fragile States Facility (FSF) currently is the 
institution’s central vehicle for arrears clearance and reengagement with countries 
emerging from conflict or crisis.  The FSF operates as an autonomous trust fund within 
the AfDB Group and receives earmarked funding through AfDF replenishments (i.e., 
donor member countries).  It also can receive resources out of the AfDB’s net income or 
surplus account.  The FSF has three support pillars: (1) arrears clearance; (2) 
supplementary financing; and (3) capability building support.  
 
Arrears Clearance Pillar:  The FSF’s Arrears Clearance Pillar provides partial funding 
for clearing AfDB Group arrears, which helps to facilitate reengagement and 
normalization with the Bank.  As a general rule, the recipient country must provide up to 
one-third of the financial resources required to clear all outstanding arrears.  Donors may 
provide contributions on behalf of the recipient country to meet this requirement.  The 
FSF provides the remaining two-thirds of the required financing.  However, the FSF has 
flexibility to adjust the burden-sharing arrangement to reflect country repayment capacity 
and extenuating circumstances.   
 
Eligibility Criteria:  There are several staged criteria that determine country eligibility for 
FSF support.  To access the supplementary financing window, a country must: (1) meet 
conditions for consolidating peace and security; (2) have experienced significant 
economic damage as a result of conflict or crisis; (3) improve macroeconomic conditions 
and debt management practices; (4) pursue sound financial management and business 
climate policies; and (5) increase transparency and accountability of financial 
management systems.  Additional eligibility criteria apply to arrears clearance resources, 
including: (1) respect for the AfDB’s preferred creditor status
23; and (2) eligibility for 
HIPC debt relief.  The AfDB Board of Directors must formally approve country 
eligibility for FSF support. 
 
Available Funding:  As of May 2009, the FSF had no available resources to finance new 
arrears clearance operations.  Under the 11
th AfDF Replenishment Agreement, member 
countries authorized the transfer of UA 420 million (roughly $650 million).  Also, the 
FSF gained access to any remaining balances within the AfDB’s Post-Conflict Countries 
Facility (previously UA 165 million, or roughly $250 million).  However, all approved 
funding was allocated to other countries emerging from crisis, such as Liberia.  
Therefore, additional resources must be mobilized for Zimbabwe to clear its AfDB 
arrears.  The most viable option is an earmark within the 12
th AfDF Replenishment, 
                                                                                                                                                 
of domestic capital market development to absorb a new issuance of government bonds; and (v) 
government net deposits in the banking system and Reserve Bank.   
22 The World Bank and IMF will prepare a forward-looking debt sustainability analysis to determine future 
financing terms after arrears have been cleared. 
23 This includes servicing new maturities on all outstanding AfDB Group loans or at least repayments on 
the relative level provided to other IFIs.  If needed, the AfDB permits bilateral donors to provide these 
repayments on the country’s behalf.  
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which member countries will begin negotiating in fall 2009.  Alternatively, the AfDB 
could hold a special donor conference to solicit FSF contributions. 
 
IMF:  As of April 2009, Zimbabwe’s arrears to the PRGF Trust Fund totaled $134 
million, or roughly 25 percent of its IMF quota.  There are several options for clearing 
these IMF arrears.  First, the IMF announced its plan to disburse $250 billion in new 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to member countries in an attempt to boost liquidity and 
international reserves in response to the global economic crisis.  The IMF will allocate 
SDR disbursements based upon member countries’ proportion of IMF quotas (i.e., 
subscriptions).
24  Under this plan, Zimbabwe will receive SDR 262 million ($408 
million).  Therefore, Zimbabwe could utilize a portion of these proceeds to clear all 
remaining PRGF Trust Fund arrears.   
 
Alternatively, Zimbabwe could pursue the more traditional arrears clearance route.  This 
entails a third-party bridge loan, which is paid off simultaneously through a new PRGF 
loan to Zimbabwe.
25  This approach involves several related steps.  First, the IMF Board 
must approve Zimbabwe’s eligibility to use PRGF resources.  Given Zimbabwe’s lack of 
policy track record, it likely will need to implement an IMF Staff-Monitored Program 
before advancing to the PRGF program.  Third, the IMF requires the clearance of official 
bilateral arrears (either paid off or rescheduled) and that other IFI arrears (World Bank, 
AfDB) are cleared or programmed to be cleared.  Lastly, the IMF will require credible 
assurances that Zimbabwe will be able to repay the new PRGF loan.  This step will 
present a significant hurdle given Zimbabwe’s acute fiscal situation and credible rumors 
that export receipts have been pledged as loan collateral (as noted in Section IV).  This 
may require a donor country providing a guarantee to meet any repayment deficits on the 
Zimbabwean government’s behalf. 
 
Paris Club:  The Paris Club is an informal, consensus-based group of creditor countries 
that are guided by several principles, including: 
 
  Comparability of Treatment:  The recipient country cannot provide more favorable 
debt treatment terms to non-Paris Club creditors.  Put differently, non-Paris Club 
creditors (other bilateral creditors, commercial banks, bondholders, etc) are expected 
to provide roughly the same (or better) levels of debt service or stock relief. 
 
  Conditionality:  The Paris Club only negotiates debt restructurings with debtor 
countries that clearly demonstrate: (a) need for debt relief; and (b) a reform track 
                                                 
24 The IMF will distribute SDR allocations totaling roughly 74.13 percent of each member countries’ quota. 
25 If Zimbabwe elects to utilize GRA resources to clear arrears, the IMF Board first must lift Zimbabwe’s 
suspension of voting rights and reverse its ineligibility to utilize the IMF’s general resources.  This would 
require a 70 percent voting majority of the Board.  Continued restrictions following Zimbabwe’s clearance 
of GRA arrears has been justified by Zimbabwe’s use of exchange rate restrictions and multiple currency 
practices as well as its lack of reporting on international reserves.  While these justifications largely were 
institutional cover for a politically-based decision, Zimbabwe will need to address them to ensure the 
expeditious removal of IMF sanctions.  
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record under an IMF program.
26  In the case of a long-term debt service (flow) 
treatment, the Paris Club agreement is divided into multiple phases.  The amounts 
falling due during the first phase are treated immediately upon the agreement’s entry 
into force.  Subsequent phases are implemented as agreed conditions are met
27, such 
as non-accumulation of new arrears and satisfactory IMF program reviews.    
 
  Case-by-Case Approach:  The Paris Club makes decisions on a case-by-case basis in 
order to tailor actions to each debtor country’s specific situation.  The level of the 
debt treatment is based on the financing gap identified through the IMF program. 
 
To clear Zimbabwe’s arrears, the Paris Club likely will apply Naples Terms to the 
rescheduling.  This would entail: (1) consolidating existing arrears; (2) rescheduling new 
payments over a set period of time (e.g., three years); and (3) applying a 67 percent 
reduction of payment obligations in net present value terms.  Given the Zimbabwean 
government’s fragile financial situation, careful consideration will be required to prevent 
any lapses in future repayments.  This is especially important as any subsequent Paris 
Club agreements, such as HIPC debt relief (outlined in greater detail below), would 
require that Zimbabwe stay current on these newly rescheduled repayments.  Due to IFIs’ 
preferred creditor status and the requirement for a formal IMF program, Paris Club 
arrears would be cleared after the IMF and likely the World Bank and African 
Development Bank.
28     
 
As noted briefly above, new and/or preexisting loans by non-traditional creditors, such as 
China, may complicate the Paris Club rescheduling process.  The comparable treatment 
principle will require that Zimbabwe treat Paris Club creditors in a similar fashion as 
other creditors.  For example, if the Zimbabwean government maintains debt repayments 
to the Chinese government, then the Paris Club may be unwilling to reschedule and 
reduce its own claims.   
 
VI.    DEBT RELIEF PROCESS 
 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC):  Since the mid-1990s, the HIPC 
Initiative has functioned as the guiding framework for providing comprehensive debt 
relief to low-income countries.  Originally launched by the World Bank and IMF in 1996, 
it was later enhanced in 1999 to provide deeper and faster debt relief to a broader set of 
countries.  The HIPC Initiative utilizes debt relief to lower countries’ external debt 
situation to levels considered sustainable.  Under the Original HIPC Initiative (1996-
                                                 
26 In practice, the recipient country must have a current IMF program, such as a Stand-By, Extended Fund 
Facility, Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, or perhaps a non-borrowing program (Policy Support 
Instrument). 
27 All relevant conditions are included in the Agreed Minutes circulated by the Paris Club Secretariat.  The 
Agreed Minutes are not a legally-binding agreement between the debtor and each Paris Club creditor.  They 
constitute a recommendation to the Paris Club creditor governments and the recipient country to conclude 
bilateral agreements implementing the provisions of the Agreed Minutes terms.   
 
28 There are no firm rules stipulating that the World Bank and African Development Bank must clear their 
arrears prior to a Paris Club rescheduling.  However, this is the typical sequencing.  
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1999), the target was an external debt-to-exports ratio of 200 percent.  The Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative (1999-current) further reduced the target external debt ratio to 150 
percent of exports.   
 
Eligibility Requirements:  Countries must meet a number of criteria to become eligible 
for the HIPC Initiative.  First, they must be classified as an “IDA-only” country.  This 
means that the country is not eligible to receive market-based loans from the IBRD.  
Similarly, the country must only be eligible to receive loans from the IMF’s Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and not from the IMF’s General Resource 
Account (GRA).
29  Second, the country must face an unsustainable debt burden after the 
full application of traditional Paris Club mechanisms, such as Naples terms.
30  As noted 
above, the country must have a debt-to-export ratio above 150 percent or a debt-to-
government revenue ratio above 250 percent.
31  Only external debt incurred by end-2004 
is eligible for HIPC Initiative consideration and debt relief.
32  Third, the country must 
begin to establish a track record of reform.  Typically, this step requires an IMF upper 
credit tranche program (e.g., PRGF program).  However, exceptions have been made to 
utilize a staff-monitored program to establish a performance track record.  Lastly, it must 
begin developing a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), either on an interim- or 
formal-basis.  PRSPs outline the relevant macroeconomic, structural and social programs 
that will promote growth and reduce poverty.  They also estimate the associated external 
financing required for effective implementation.  Currently, 40 countries are eligible for 
the HIPC Initiative; Zimbabwe is not among them.
33 
 
In 2004, World Bank and IMF shareholders closed the list of HIPC eligible countries.   
At the time, a number of additional countries were “grandfathered” into the Initiative, 
including: Afghanistan, Eritrea, Haiti, and the Kyrgyz Republic.  Zimbabwe was not 
grandfathered for eligibility since it was classified as an IDA-blend country.  Thus, it did 
not meet the HIPC Initiative’s income and creditworthiness criterion.  As a result, the 
World Bank and IMF Board of Directors will need to formally decide to re-open HIPC 
eligibility for Zimbabwe.  Section VII examines how Zimbabwe currently stacks up on 
HIPC eligibility requirements. 
 
Interim Debt Relief (HIPC Decision Point):  Once becoming HIPC-eligible, a country 
must meet a series of performance criteria before receiving interim debt service relief.  
                                                 
29 As noted previously, PRGF lending is limited to low-income countries and GRA assistance is tailored for 
middle-income countries. 
30 “Naples Terms” provide debt stock reduction of up to 67 percent from Paris Club creditors and re-
scheduling terms for remaining debt.  
31 This second ratio is designed to capture countries where the fiscal burden of external debt is particularly 
acute.  Several countries, such as Guyana, have used this so-called fiscal ratio to secure HIPC eligibility. 
32 This also means that end-2004 data is utilized to determine whether the country’s external indebtedness 
ratios are unsustainable. 
33 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) include: Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
and Zambia.  
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First, the country must establish a track record of macroeconomic stability.  Historically, 
the IMF and World Bank required sustained performance for 18 months.  More recently, 
the time requirement has been reduced for many countries, sometimes as short as six 
months.  Second, the country must finalize its Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.  
The Interim PRSP should incorporate input from a variety of relevant stakeholders, such 
as civil society and private businesses.  Lastly, the country must clear any outstanding 
arrears to the World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank.  After this, World Bank 
and IMF staff will complete a formal loan-by-loan sustainability analysis to determine the 
country’s indebtedness level and the amount of debt relief required to lower its external 
ratios to sustainable levels.  These calculations will assume a standard Naples Terms 
treatment of Paris Club debt (67 percent NPV reduction) in determining the amount of 
IFI debt relief required.  After which, the World Bank and IMF determine a ‘common 
reduction factor’ required by all creditors to bring Zimbabwe’s external debt-to-exports 
ratio to 150 percent.  Therefore, the Paris Club would be required to implement another 
debt treatment to implement the common reduction factor (on top of the Naples Terms 
treatment).  The IFIs would only apply the common reduction factor to their existing 
loans under the HIPC Initiative.  Lastly, the World Bank and IMF Executive Board of 
Directors must formally decide that the country should begin receiving interim debt 
service relief on a provisional basis (HIPC Decision Point status).   
 
Irrevocable Debt Relief (HIPC Completion Point):  To qualify for irrevocable debt relief, 
the country must meet additional performance criteria.  First, it must continue to maintain 
macroeconomic stability under an IMF-supported program, such as a PRGF for one year.  
Second, the country must implement key structural and social reforms as agreed at the 
HIPC Decision Point.  Lastly, the country must implement the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper satisfactorily for one year.  At this point, the World Bank and IMF 
Executive Board of Directors formally consider and approve irrevocable debt relief 
(HIPC Completion Point status).  The HIPC framework also includes a “topping-up” 
provision by which additional debt relief can be applied in exceptional cases to offset 
exogenous factors that have fundamentally changed the country's economic 
circumstances, such as unexpected commodity price movements that severely impact 
export earnings. 
 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative:  In 2005, G-7 nations took the additional step of 
forcing the World Bank (IDA), African Development Bank (AfDF), and IMF to cancel 
100 percent of their remaining debt claims outstanding on the world’s poorest countries.
34  
Through the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), HIPCs stand to receive up to $60 
billion in debt relief over time.  To date, 24 countries have already seen the cancellation 
of over $30 billion of debt obligations.
35  MDRI eligibility is intertwined with the HIPC 
Initiative.  Countries automatically receive 100 percent debt cancellation upon reaching 
                                                 
34 Under MDRI, countries receive 100 percent debt relief on all remaining debt obligations prior to 
operable cutoff dates.  The cutoff dates for eligible disbursed and outstanding debt are: (1) IDA – 
December 31, 2003; (2) AfDF – December 31, 2004; and IMF – December 31, 2004.  Debt that is 
contracted and/or disbursed after these cutoff dates are ineligible for MDRI relief. 
35 Source:  Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) – Status of Implementation, September 2008.  
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HIPC Completion Point.  In this manner, there are no additional eligibility requirements 
for MDRI debt relief assistance.   
 
Non-Traditional Creditors:  Under the HIPC Initiative, non-traditional creditors – such as 
China – are expected to provide comparable debt relief.  These players account for 
roughly 13 percent of projected total HIPC debt relief costs.  To date, the share of debt 
relief provided by non-traditional creditors has been low – roughly 40 percent of 
expected levels.
36  Therefore, lack of progress has a direct impact on recipient countries.  
For completion point countries, China has provided roughly half of its expected share of 
debt relief.  According to press reports, it signed a number of debt relief agreements with 
African countries over the last year.  Nonetheless, Zimbabwe likely will face challenges 
in securing comprehensive debt relief assistance. 
 
Commercial creditors:  Debt restructuring or relief from commercial creditors is a process 
that depends on the respective exposure profiles.  The so-called “London Club” has been 
the traditional forum for commercial debt reschedulings and relief treatments when banks 
are the main holders.  It is an even more informal “club” of creditors formed on an ad hoc 
basis when requested by the debtor country.  Although it sounds similar to the Paris Club, 
it does not have fixed members and the committees are dissolved once a deal is struck.  In 
this sense, the London Club is less of an actual institution than an occasional meeting for 
all commercial sovereign debt holders to collectively negotiate restructuring with country 
officials.  The term London Club may not even be used if the commercial debt is mostly 
held by private funds rather than banks.  Like the official creditor groups, commercial 
creditors have typically sought comparability of treatment (no creditors can be treated 
differently from each other, including official creditors) and often use Paris Club terms as 
a benchmark. London Club negotiations have usually required 90-95 percent compliance 
to reach final agreement.  The combination of potentially large (and often uncooperative) 
numbers of bondholders and the near-unanimity required to reach an agreed settlement 
means that commercial creditor negotiations can be time-consuming.
37 
 
IDA Debt Reduction Facility:  The World Bank Executive Board established the Debt 
Reduction Facility (DRF) in 1989 to buy back debts owed to external, commercial 
creditors – at steep discounts – through grant funding to eligible governments.  The 
Facility, which is managed by the Bank’s Economic Policy and Debt Department, has 
played a significant role in reducing commercial debt exposure in low-income countries.  
To date, it has supported 22 buy-back operations in 21 IDA-only countries.  Only one 
non-HIPC country (Albania) has received Facility assistance.
38  These operations have 
removed roughly $4.5 billion of commercial debt principal and more than $3.5 billion of 
associated interest arrears and penalties.  As a result, it has helped to reduce the risk of 
non-concessional creditors taking advantage of bilateral and multilateral debt relief (so-
called “free riding”), which has the effect of improving debt repayment capacity.  In this 
                                                 
36 World Bank and IMF (2008).  HIPC Initiative Progress Report 
37 London Club negotiations with Poland took more than a decade.  More recently, Nigeria was able to 
conclude a buyback agreement with its commercial creditors in less than one year.   
38 World Bank (2004).  Debt Reduction Facility for IDA-Only countries: Progress Report, Support to the 
HIPC Initiative, and Proposed Enhancements.  
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manner, litigating creditors – often called “vulture funds” – derive the benefits from debt 
relief without having to pay anything for it.      
 
Eligibility for Debt Reduction Facility support requires: (1) IDA-only status; (2) highly-
indebted status; (3) satisfactory performance under a medium-term adjustment program 
(i.e., an IMF staff monitored program); and (4) satisfactory implementation of a debt 
management strategy.  Only external commercial debt with a sovereign guarantee is 
eligible for Facility buy-back operations.
39  To date, the average haircut for commercial 
creditors has been roughly 90 percent on Facility buy-back operations.  In April 2009, 
Liberia secured a Facility-supported buy-back deal retiring $1.2 billion in commercial 
claims, which included a 97 percent haircut for creditors. 
 
VII.   ZIMBABWE’S CASE FOR IDA RECLASSIFICATION  
 
IDA-Only Status:  As noted briefly above, the World Bank classifies countries into two 
broad categories.  Low-income countries have access to concessional loans and grants 
from IDA.  Middle-income countries borrow from the IBRD – the World Bank’s market-
based financing window.  Eligibility for IDA’s concessional assistance is based on two 
criteria – income and lack of commercial credit access.  We examine how Zimbabwe 
matches up on each of these criteria.   
 
Income Level:  The current IDA income per capita threshold is $1,095.  In 2006, the 
World Bank estimated that Zimbabwe’s gross national income (GNI) per capita was 
roughly $340.  According to the IMF, Zimbabwe’s GDP declined by an additional 10 
percent in 2008 to approximately $3.18 billion.
40  With a static population size of 13.4 
million,
41 this would translate into a GDP per capita of $240 in 2008.  Regardless of the 
exact figure, it is clear that Zimbabwe’s current income levels are far below the IDA 
threshold by any relevant measure.   
Figure 4 – Zimbabwe: GNI Per Capita versus Country Categories, 1980-2006 
 
 
                                                 
39 Eligible debt includes medium- and long-term non-collateralized debts owed to external commercial 
creditors and short-term debt of similar nature that have been in long standing arrears. 
40 IMF (May 2009).  Zimbabwe: 2009 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report. 
41 Zimbabwe’s true population size is difficult to estimate given the significant exodus of people during the 
recent economic crisis and political repression.  Many estimate that over 3 million Zimbabweans emigrated 
to South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and other countries. 
Year Zimbabwe Low-Income Avg Middle-Income Avg IDA Operational Cutoff
1980 930                          398 757 N/A
1985 740                          287 758 N/A
1990 860                          309 972 N/A
1995 600                          293 1,231 905
2000 450                          320 1,392 895
2001 530                          324 1,401 885
2002 780                          329 1,421 865
2003 760                          358 1,560 875
2004 560                          410 1,829 865
2005 340                          462 2,146 895
2006 340                          517 2,479 965 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator Database 
 
Creditworthiness:  Zimbabwe has virtually no access to private credit today and has not 
borrowed from the IBRD since 1994.  As noted previously, Zimbabwe fell into payment 
arrears on its IBRD debt in 1999.  In recent years, it has secured some external 
commercial credit based on export collateralization (e.g., platinum or gold deposits).  As 
noted previously, credible reports suggest that China has provided substantial asset-
backed loans to the Zimbabwean government.  However, loans from entities with robust 
and credible financial risk management controls have evaporated in the last year or so.  
The conservative fiscal management policies, such as cash-based budgeting, recently 
implemented under Finance Minister Biti’s direction have further dissuaded non-
traditional creditors from providing non-transparent loans to the Zimbabwean 
government.  Currently, no reputable creditor would provide commercial loans to 
Zimbabwe given its extreme external debt burden. 
 
For illustration purposes, below we compare Zimbabwe’s current external debt ratios to 
those of other IDA-blend countries.  For the debt-to-GDP ratio, only Grenada and 
Dominica exceed 50 percent.  In both cases, the IMF has stressed the imperative of taking 
aggressive action to reduce external debt exposure.  In contrast, Zimbabwe’s debt-to-
GDP ratio is 166 percent, or roughly 137 percentage points higher than the average IDA-
blend country.  Particularly striking is Zimbabwe’s annual debt service-to-government 
revenues ratio of 270 percent.   
 
 
Figure 5 – External Indebtedness Ratios for Existing IDA-Blend Countries 
 
 
Source: IMF Article IV Country Reports  
 
In addition, Zimbabwe appears to have as strong a case for reclassification based on 
historical precedent.  The previous four African cases of “reverse graduation” to IDA-
only status were Cote d’Ivoire in 1992, Cameroon and the Republic of the Congo in 
IDA-Blend Countries IBRD Access Debt-to-GDP Debt-to-Revenues Debt Service-to-Revenues
Armenia Yes 16% 37% 2%
Azerbaijan Yes 19% - -
Bolivia No 11% 42% 15%
Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes 15%
Dominica Yes 53% 135% 19%
Georgia Yes 21% - -
Grenada Yes 78% - -
India Yes 19% - -
Pakistan Yes 26% - -
St. Lucia Yes 44% 152% 25%
St. Vincent Yes 34% 97% 19%
Uzbekistan Yes 11% 29% 2%
Zimbabwe No 166% 4378% 270%
Average (no Zimbabwe) - 29% 82% 13%
Differential - 137% 4296% 257%
Debt Stock Ratios Debt Service Ratios 
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1994, and Nigeria in 2005.
42  In the earlier three cases, their status was changed soon 
after they dropped below the IDA income threshold (see Appendix VI).  In Nigeria’s 
case, this occurred only after a path to debt relief was already negotiated, but when the 
country’s per capita income has plunged to less than half the threshold level.  Although 
IDA classification is a decision taken by the World Bank staff, in practice they will look 
to the Board of Directors for guidance when to make such a change.  In Zimbabwe’s 
case, such a change is unlikely until the Board has given a clear signal that relations have 
normalized and debt relief is being actively pursued. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Zimbabwe is embarking on a long, complex, and difficult journey to rebuild its economy, 
which has been shattered by years of neglect and destructive government policies.  If the 
final political hurdles are overcome, the new coalition government will be faced with 
making politically difficult decisions and to addressing conclusively the economic ghosts 
of the past.  Clearing Zimbabwe’s external debt arrears and securing comprehensive debt 
relief is a critical step in this process.  By doing so, the government will remove a 
crippling burden on its budget, investment climate, and overall macroeconomic 
environment.  More importantly to the success of the coalition government, it will unlock 
hundreds of millions of dollars in new external assistance for critical reconstruction 
programs that will improve the Zimbabwean people’s quality of life.  This paper provides 
a detailed overview of the arrears clearance and debt relief processes and hopefully will 
buttress the government’s analytical foundation when it embarks on this important 
journey.  With a strong dedicated team of experts – and support from relevant donor 
agencies – the Zimbabwean government will one day conclusively address its crushing 
debt burden and proceed with the rebuilding of a once vibrant and proud nation.
                                                 
42 See Todd Moss, Scott Standley, and Nancy Birdsall, “Double-Standards, Debt Treatment, and World 
Bank Country Classification: The Case of Nigeria,” CGD Working Paper Number 45, Center for Global 






















Manufacturing Rehabilitation Imports Program Project 26-Mar-81 31-Mar-82 65 50 15 65 Multi-Sector
Transport Rehabilitation Imports Program Project 19-May-81 30-Jun-86 42 42 0 42 Infrastructure (Transportation)
Small Farm Credit Project 21-Sep-82 30-Jun-88 30.4 0 30.4 30.4 Agriculture 
Petroleum Fuels Supply Technical Assistance Project 28-Sep-82 30-Jun-86 1.2 0 1.2 1.2 Infrastructure (Oil & Gas)
Power Project 14-Dec-82 30-Jun-90 105.0 105.0 0.0 105.0 Infrastructure (Power Sector)
Manufacturing Export Promotion Project 15-Feb-83 30-Jul-87 70.6 70.6 0.0 70.6 Multi-Sector
Rural Afforestation Project 17-May-83 31-Mar-89 7.3 0.0 7.3 7.3 Agriculture
Highway Project (01) 17-May-83 30-Jun-88 26.4 26.4 0.0 26.4 Infrastructure (Transportation)
National Agricultural Extension and Research Project (01) 7-Jul-83 30-Sep-91 13.1 13.1 0.0 13.1 Agriculture
Railway Development Project 2-Aug-83 30-Jun-90 121.3 40.0 0.0 40.0 Infrastructure (Transportation)
Urban Development Project 19-Jun-84 30-Sep-93 43.0 43.0 0.0 43.0 Infrastructure (Urban Development)
Small Scale Enterprises Project (01) 9-May-85 30-Jun-94 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 SME Development
Health Project 22-Jul-86 30-Sep-93 10.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 Health
Power Project (02) 12-Jan-88 30-Jun-94 44.0 44.0 0.0 44.0 Infrastructure (Power Sector)
Highway Project (02) 10-May-88 30-Jun-95 32.7 32.7 0.0 32.7 Infrastructure (Transportation)
Agricultural Credit and Export Promotion Project 18-May-89 31-Dec-97 36.3 36.3 0.0 36.3 Agriculture
Urban Project (02) 1-Jun-89 31-Dec-99 580.0 80.0 0.0 80.0 Infrastructure (Water)
Forest Resources Management & Development Project 22-Mar-90 30-Jun-98 64.1 14.5 0.0 14.5 Forestry
Railways Project (02) 4-Dec-90 30-Jun-99 263.2 38.6 0.0 38.6 Infrastructure (Transportation)
Family Health Project (02) 4-Jun-91 31-Dec-98 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 Health
Structural Adjustment Credit Project 21-Jan-92 31-Dec-93 390.0 125.0 50.0 175.0 Multi-Sector
Emergency Drought Recovery and Mitigation Project 24-Jun-92 31-Mar-95 151.1 0.0 150.0 150.0 Infrastructure (Water)
Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) Prevention and Care 17-Jun-93 31-Dec-00 64.5 0.0 64.5 64.5 Health
Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) Project (02) 29-Jun-93 31-Dec-97 125.0 0.0 125.0 125.0 Multi-Sector
Power Project (03) 18-Jan-94 31-Dec-99 200.2 90.0 0.0 90.0 Infrastructure (Power Sector)
Enterprise Development 25-Apr-96 31-Dec-02 106.0 0.0 70.0 70.0 Infrastructure (Power Sector)
Rural District Council Pilot Capital Development Project 29-May-97 30-Jun-00 19.8 0.0 12.3 12.3 Infrastructure (Water)
Community Action Project 19-May-98 31-Dec-03 60.0 0.0 60.0 60.0 Health
Agricultural Services and Management Project 29-May-98 31-Jul-01 33.4 0.0 8.8 8.8 Agriculture
Park Rehabilitation and Conservation Project 2-Jun-98 30-Sep-05 70.0 0.0 62.5 62.5 Infrastructure (Water)
Land Reform Support Project 16-Sep-99 31-Dec-01 7.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 Agriculture (Land Reform)
TOTAL 2,817.6 896.2 662.0 1,558.2
Sector Breakdown WB Total Percent
Infrastructure 837.7 54%
Transportation 179.7 12%
Oil & Gas 1.2 0%





SME Development 10.0 1%
Forestry 14.5 1%








Source: IMF press reports and country documents  
Note:  As of June 17, 2009, the exchange rate is SDR1=USD1.54 
Year Date Program and IMF Board Actions




General Resources Account 
(in SDRs)
PRGF-ESF Trust Account 
(in SDRs)
Total










1990 IMF approves Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) loan
1991 IMF initiates ESAF loan 310,000,000 4 years
1992 102,500,000 54,700,000 157,200,000
1993 17,400,000 30,400,000 47,800,000
1994 19,100,000 33,400,000 52,500,000
1995 ESAF loan expires 19,100,000 33,400,000 52,500,000
1996 158,100,000 151,900,000 310,000,000
1997
1998 1-Jun IMF approves Stand-By Credit Arrangement 130,750,000 13 months 39,200,000 0 39,200,000
1999 2-Aug IMF approves Stand-By Credit Arrangement 141,360,000 14 months 24,740,000 0 24,740,000
2000 1-Oct Stand-By Arrangement expires 222,040,000 151,900,000
2001 373,940,000
2002 14-Jun
IMF adopts Declaration of Noncooperation for Zimbabwe and suspends technical 
assistance
2003 6-Jun IMF suspends Zimbabwe's voting and related rights
2003 3-Dec IMF initiates compulsory withdrawal procedures for Zimbabwe





2009 6-May IMF Executive Board approves targeted technical assistance
IMF Actions Time
Total IMF Disbursements
Actual Disbursement of Funds
Zimbabwe has been in 
continuous arrears to the 
IMF since February 2001 
and is the only case of 
protracted arrears to the 
PRGF-ESF Trust, which 
currently total SDR 89 






Zimbabwe: Gross ODA Loan Disbursements, by OECD-DAC Creditor 






Note - OECD-DAC member countries have not provided ODA loan disbursements to Zimbabwe since 2002
Donor 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Austria 0.6 8.8 9.4
Belgium 2.7 1.0 3.7
Canada 2.0 8.9 2.8 5.1 4.7 0.6 24.0
Denmark 5.2 0.2 4.3 3.2 5.4 4.7 5.7 11.9 6.6 0.7 0.8 2.6 0.4 1.5 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.1 55.5
EC 0.3 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.1 19.9 25.2 45.6 23.5 11.3 5.6 6.4 140.7
Finland 2.2 1.2 1.0 4.3 3.6 6.0 2.7 9.3 10.1 11.8 9.2 8.4 0.1 6.5 4.8 0.5 81.6
France 7.9 8.0 5.7 4.6 3.6 12.9 9.3 9.3 15.7 15.7 7.5 4.5 9.1 10.3 7.3 0.4 0.3 1.8 1.5 0.5 0.0 136.0
Germany 0.8 16.4 15.1 20.8 13.5 16.0 22.8 18.0 17.5 5.4 21.4 23.0 32.2 37.3 24.3 16.0 21.4 11.1 3.3 0.8 0.2 0.3 337.5
Italy 13.4 3.6 0.2 18.8 6.1 7.1 3.5 7.6 12.1 11.9 11.9 8.0 16.6 5.2 125.8
Japan 7.6 9.3 2.6 1.4 6.3 0.2 1.1 7.8 12.9 9.2 8.0 3.3 1.7 4.5 2.4 1.9 33.5 21.8 16.3 14.8 166.5
Luxembourg 0.0
Netherlands 4.0 7.2 4.2 7.5 8.1 4.2 5.1 3.0 1.7 1.6 0.0 11.2 1.6 59.4
Spain 6 . 86 . 0 6 . 33 . 10 . 9 2 3 . 0
Switzerland 1.1 1.9 1.1 1.9 2.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 8.6
United Kingdom 13.0 12.5 6.6 3.9 2.8 0.6 3.7 2.5 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.5 2.4 2.0 8.5 5.7 16.2 7.4 5.0 0.5 -1.8 93.6
United States 3.0 9.0 40.0 5.0 9.9 66.9









Source: World Bank and IMF (September 2008), Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) – Status of Implementation, p27
Litigating Creditors
(number) (in USD millions) (% of GDP) (in USD millions) (% of GDP)
Afghanistan 0 0 0 0 0
Benin 0 0 0 0 0
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0
B u r k i n a  F a s o 00 00 0
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0
Cameroon 4 158 0.8 51 0.2
Central African Republic 0 0 0 0 0
C h a d - ----
C o m o r o s - ----
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1 100 1.0 100 1.0
Congo, Republic of 8 575 7.5 443 5.8
Cote d'Ivoire - - - - -
E r i t r e a - ----
Ethiopia 2 187 1.0 - -
Gambia, the - - - - -
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0
G u i n e a - ----
G u i n e a - B i s s a u 00 00 0
Guyana 3 46 4.5 - -
Haiti 0 0 0 0 0
Honduras 1 1 0 - -
Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 0 0 0
Liberia 10 130 17.8 357 49.0
M a d a g a s c a r - ----
M a l a w i 00 00 0
M a l i - ----
Mauritania 0 0 0 0 0
Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0
N e p a l - ----
N i c a r a g u a 59 0 . 20 0
Niger 0 0 0 0 0
R w a n d a 00 00 0
Sao Tome & Principe 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal 0 0 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 5 29 1.7 25 1.5
Sudan 3 151 0.3 146 0.3
T a n z a n i a 00 00 0
T o g o - ----
Uganda 6 36 0.3 30 0.3
Zambia 2 55 0.5 16 0.1
TOTAL 50 1,477 1,168









Preparatory Work & Analysis Pre-Eligibility Requirements HIPC Decision Point Eligibility
(1) Secure debt relief champion (1) IDA re-classification (1) Complete Interim PRSP
(2) Compile all existing debt obligations (2) Secure HIPC country eligibility (2) Satisfactory IMF Agreement performance
(3) Audit debt claims for accuracy and status  (3) IMF Staff-Monitored Program  (3) Paris Club Agreement
(4) Clear IFI debt arrears
(5) Clear Paris Club arrears (Naples Terms)
(5) Secure IFI technical assistance (6) Begin Interim PRSP preparation
(7) Initiate IDA Debt Reduction Facility 
discussions
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative HIPC Completion Point Eligibility
(1) Satisfactory IMF Agreement performance
(2) PRSP implementation for one-year
(3) Achieve IMF/WB structural reform triggers
(4) Final Paris Club Agreement
(5) IFI Board Approval for Completion Point 
(irrevocable debt stock relief reducing NPV 
debt/export ratio to 150%)
(1) Automatic 100% cancellation of 
remaining eligible IDA, AfDF, and IMF 
obligations
(4) IFI Board approval for interim HIPC Relief 
(conditional debt service relief)
(4) Complete IMF Article IV review (updated 
country data and analysis)
(5) Initiate IDA Debt Reduction Facility 
negotiations






Long-Term Income of African Reverse IDA Graduates 
 
Source: GNI Per Capita data from 2008 World Development Indicators; IDA Eligibility Operational Cutoff data from World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
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Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) 
 
In 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA), 
which provided a symbolic gesture of support for ‘the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect 
peaceful and democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore the 
rule of law.’  In punitive terms, ZDERA prohibits the provision of U.S. development assistance until the 
President of the United States certifies that Zimbabwe has met a number of conditions.
43  The only 
exemptions include assistance for humanitarian purposes or governance reforms.  In addition, ZDERA 
requires that the U.S. Executive Director
44 at each International Financial Institution must oppose and 
vote against any new loan, credit, guarantee, or the provision of IFI debt relief.   
 
In practice, ZDERA has had no discernible impact on U.S. or IFI assistance programs.  First, the World 
Bank, African Development Bank, and IMF each halted their assistance programs in 2000 on their own 
after the Zimbabwean government went into payment arrears.  In other words, the Zimbabwean 
government effectively imposed financial sanctions on itself due to its lack of payment compliance.  
Even if Zimbabwe remained eligible for new assistance, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. Treasury 
Department alone would have been able to prevent it.  Given its relatively small voting share,
45 the U.S. 
would need to build large shareholder coalitions to block any new IFI assistance.  This has proven very 
difficult in the past.  For example, the U.S. Congress has imposed similar IFI voting directives in the 
case of Iran.  Despite this, the World Bank approved projects totaling nearly $900 million for Iran 
between 2003 and 2005.  With respect to ZDERA’s impact on bilateral programs, the U.S. Government 
already had made a decision to halt development assistance programs – with the exception of 
humanitarian aid – following the un-democratic and repressive elections in 2000.  In this manner, the 
Congress merely codified existing U.S. foreign policy and did not have an incremental impact on the 
ground.   
 
While ZDERA has not been the driver of policy decisions, it will nonetheless play an important role in 
the context of Zimbabwe’s efforts to clear IFI arrears and secure new assistance, including debt relief.  
Now that the Obama Administration supports reengaging the Zimbabwean government, ZDERA’s 
provisions could become obstacle without additional Congressional action. The financial arrangements 
associated with arrears clearance and debt relief will require U.S. support, including both financial and 
                                                 
43 These conditions include: (1) restoration of the rule of law in Zimbabwe; (2) certain election or pre-election conditions 
have been met; (3) the Government has demonstrated a commitment to an equitable, legal, and transparent land reform 
program that is consistent with agreements reached at the International Donors' Conference on Land Reform and 
Resettlement in Zimbabwe in September 1998; (4) the Government is making a good faith effort to fulfill the terms of the 
Lusaka Agreement that ended the Congo war; and (5) Zimbabwean state security services have become subordinate to the 
elected civilian Government. 
44 The U.S. Executive Directors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  They are the official 
representative of the United States at each institution.  In practical terms, the Executive Directors receive guidance from and 
report to the Under Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Treasury Department, also a position confirmed by the U.S. 
Senate. 
45 The United States has the following voting shares: (a) IMF – 16.77 percent; (b) World Bank/IBRD – 16.4 percent; (c) 
World Bank/IDA – 12.1 percent; (d) African Development Bank – roughly 9 percent; and (e) African Development Fund – 
6.5 percent.  
26 
 
political.  As such, the ZDERA’s legislative restrictions will need to be removed beforehand.  There are 
two ways to eliminate the relevant restrictions.  First, President Obama can certify that the specific pre-
conditions have been met.  However, the current conditions in Zimbabwe likely would prevent such a 
certification.  For example, the Obama Administration would have a difficult time arguing that: (a) rule 
of law has been restored; (b) the government is committed to equitable, legal, and transparent land 
reform; and/or (c) state security forces are subordinate to the civilian government.  Alternatively, the 
U.S. Congress could repeal the legislation or pass new legislation that supersedes ZDERA.  Either way, 
this is an important obstacle that must be addressed with the Obama Administration and the 111
th 
Congress. 